This Sunday, 29 September 2024, Montenegro held snap local elections in Podgorica. Thirteen electoral lists competed for 59 seats in the City Assembly of the country’s capital (the mayor is elected by a majority of assembly members). Since the city accounts for roughly one-third of the country’s population, these elections are indicative of national trends. While one might expect a decline in negative campaigning due to the dissipation of (ethno)political polarization in Montenegro and a shift in focus to socio-economic and everyday life issues, the campaign was marked by unprecedentedly dirty tactics among the major contenders.
The snap elections were the result of an internal split within the Europe Now Movement (PES): between the President of Montenegro, Jakov Milatović, and Prime Minister Milojko Spajić. Personal animosities and political differences between these two leaders culminated at the local level, causing the ruling coalition to collapse. Some members of PES, along with coalition partners United Reform Action (URA), Movement for Changes (PzP), and the opposition, voted to shorten the mandate of the City Assembly, effectively triggering snap elections.
On the one hand, Milatović became the face of a coalition composed of his loyalists, URA, and PzP, hoping to capitalize on his popularity after winning nearly 60% of the vote in the second round of the 2023 presidential elections. However, his direct involvement in the local elections – despite his emphasis on being “the president for all citizens” – along with public outbursts, including verbal attacks on journalists for asking legitimate questions, proved detrimental to the success of his list and the fairly popular mayoral candidate Luka Rakčević. Ultimately, the list secured only 10.52% of the vote, or 6 seats, which is 5 fewer than they previously held.
On the other hand, despite holding key positions in the government, including the Prime Minister and his deputy, the coalition between PES and Democratic Montenegro (DCG) became more of a burden than a benefit for its mayoral candidate, Saša Mujović, a university professor often referred to as “the best minister in the Spajić government”. More discerning voters were unwilling to overlook the negative practices that characterized Spajić’s governance, ultimately refraining from voting for the popular mayoral candidate. As a result, the PES–DCG coalition performed below expectations, winning only 14 seats (21.77%).
The third major constituent of the government, running on a separate electoral list, was the right-wing For the Future of Montenegro (ZBCG). While they underperformed relative to their own expectations, they secured a solid 20.16% of the vote, winning 13 seats. The key opposition party, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), which likely ran the best-organized campaign, capitalized on the mistakes of the ruling coalition both locally and nationally, as well as on the popularity of their mayoral candidate, Nermin Abdić, a well-respected local physician. DPS won 19 seats, or 29.95% of the vote. The remaining seats were distributed among DPS’s partners: the European Alliance (ES), which secured 2 seats (5.43%), and the Party of European Progress (SEP), led by former DPS deputy president and prime minister Duško Marković, which also won 2 seats (3.08%). Finally, the grassroots movement Reversal, the biggest positive surprise of the elections, won 2 seats with 3.33%.
While forming the new local government is likely to be a lengthy process given the election results, the major question remains whether the DPS is returning to power. Analyzing the situation in terms of the bloc division characteristic of polarized Montenegro provides a clearer picture. The number of votes for DPS and its traditional partners has been steadily declining over the last three City Assembly elections in Podgorica: 58,374 votes in 2018, 37,895 in 2022, and 33,439 in 2024. In absolute terms, the “DPS bloc” has nearly halved over the span of six years. However, when factoring in the 24,467 votes this bloc received in the 2023 parliamentary elections – its lowest point – the reversal of this trend in 2024 becomes evident.
Nevertheless, in the context of a low voter turnout of 56.46%, DPS’s nominal “victory” may seem more significant than it actually is. It is more a “symptom” of the failures of the Spajić government and the Milatović presidency – which initially raised high hopes for structural changes but frequently ended up continuing the negative practices of DPS’s three-decade rule – than of DPS demonstrating a desire for reforms or offering anything genuinely new.