Kosovo has conducted its first regular elections since declaring independence in 2008. Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje party, which governed with an unprecedented parliamentary majority, now faced a critical test of its leadership at the ballot box.
However, Kurti’s gamble for absolute power met stiff resistance. His push for an overwhelming mandate, seeking 500,000 votes to cement an absolute majority, was nothing short of a power play, one which other parties in the region have successfully attempted. His bid aimed not only to secure unchallenged control over parliament and government but also to pave the way for his party’s grip on the presidency, which gets elected by parliament in 2026.
Kurti sought to replicate the unprecedented triumph of 2021, when many factors, such as the collapse of the government during the pandemic and a united opposition bloc against him, made the electoral choice stark: Kurti versus everyone else. That contrast propelled him to a landslide victory, surpassing 50% of the vote. But 2025 was a different battlefield. Kurti wasn’t offering a vision this time but demanding political dominance. Instead of rallying behind him, Kosovo’s electorate slightly pushed back. This brings political turmoil into the country, forcing parties to negotiate and form coalitions to govern. Given the results, no single party can take the lead alone, which is the saving grace of this election.
A System Resistant to Single-Party Rule but not Immune to Dysfunction
The 2025 election results signal a significant shift in the political landscape, returning to a more pluralistic and balanced multi-party system. While presenting immense challenges for government formation and securing the majority that the coalition needs to advance the president's election in the parliament, the outcome underscores a maturing democratic process in which no single party can claim unchecked dominance.
With Vetëvendosje securing around 40%, PDK approximately 20%, and LDK near 17%, the numbers tell a story of modest victories and unmet expectations. Despite its lead, Vetëvendosje fell short of the sweeping mandate it had sought, while opposition parties performed well below their ambitions.
Kosovo’s electorate has demonstrated political awareness and rebuked the ruling party while keeping its challengers humble. For the government, the results underscore growing public frustration, seen as a response to political arrogance, non-inclusive governance, and limited progress domestically and internationally.
Yet, the opposition failed to fully capitalise on this discontent. In the past four years, internal restructuring has taken priority over offering a compelling vision for governance. The reasons for this are manifold: They are still daunted by their past, which has been mired in corruption scandals and lacks legitimacy, as well as their predilection to favour businesses close to them. Thus, the political landscape is unsettled, and the electorate is still searching for truly transformative leadership.
From Polarization to Coalition: What is Next?
The recent political campaign in Kosovo was marked by intense divisions. Parties focused more on fuelling animosity and deepening societal rifts than presenting substantive, realistic programmes. While the opposition political parties, to their credit, did offer programmes, many of their ideas, whether it be the foundation of an airline or investments, showed a profound disengagement or perhaps even ignorance of the needs of Kosovar citizens who have been facing rising prices and decreased security, both economic and in terms of the security.
Despite the election results signalling a likely prolonged period of negotiations to form a government, the toxic political discourse has only intensified. In a move that was both disappointing and strategically (mis)calculated, Albin Kurti, in his victory speech, referred to the opposition as “hayvans”, a term of Turkish origin used to describe animals. A divisive victory speech is unprecedented and dangerous for a democratic setting of the elections and the campaign.
If Vetëvendosje resigns itself to opposition status because it cannot form a coalition with enough parliamentary votes, the mandate to form a government would be given to the second-largest party. Such a scenario would come at a significant political cost, especially if the opposition parties keep their current strategy of having a non-Vetëvendosje government. Not only would the party that secured the most votes be sidelined, but Kosovo could also see a repeat of the 2020 political crisis when opposition forces united against Kurti. This would likely result in a fragile government, further deepening the political crisis.
The real test would come in 2026, when the opposition, if in power, would require the votes of Vetëvendosje to elect a president. At that moment, Kurti’s party could wield its influence to corner the opposition parties, triggering another political impasse and potentially snap elections.
Alternatively, in the unlikely event that Vetëvendosje does create a coalition with any of the larger opposition parties, this could mean more stability and perhaps a time for a re-think for both Vetëvendosje and the other opposition parties, ensuring a smoother government, albeit a short-lived one considering the low likelihood of Vetëvendosje and the opposition parties seeing eye to eye long-term.
The question is whether Kosovo’s leaders will recognise the perils of continued division or allow history to repeat itself, once again plunging the country into political instability at the cost of its citizens.
The remnants of polarisation and the hidden danger of ‘the good guys’
These elections also beg the question of the legacy of a party that previously managed to get 50% of the votes and why a coalition government would be a saving grace now that it did not secure the same support.
Firstly, Vetëvendosje made two electoral choices which needed to be critically assessed by citizens. They decided not to share a new electoral programme, even though they have admitted to failures in their policies, particularly on the domestic political front. Secondly, choosing to boycott the media in terms of attendance at media shows where candidates had a chance to present their ideas and programmes was also a choice that lowered the threshold for accountability for a sitting government. There are valid criticisms directed at the media landscape in Kosovo. However, the media is a way of communicating with citizens and being held accountable for those statements. The Vetëvendosje of the opposition would have (rightfully) heavily criticised both of these electoral choices. The fact that they did not win the same majority shows that many citizens chose to punish these choices. This gives the chance to Vetëvendosje to reconsider its position moving forward. In that sense, a coalition government would also be suitable for Vetëvendosje should it decide to follow that route, as this would potentially leave them space for reform in order to win the next election on merit rather than the strategic use of frustration of their potential new role as the opposition.
The media boycott also poses a broader question about the role of the media in the Kosovo landscape and election politics. Vetëvendosje was heavily criticised in all the media outlets by analysts of different backgrounds. The media shows added to the polarisation and oftentimes opened questions of legitimacy and transparency of the positions held by analysts. As a viewer, one would likely feel more confused than enlightened by the different debate shows heavily dominated by men. The fact that Vetëvendosje garnered over 40% of the vote despite this environment should make the media and political observers consider the role of media as a tool of information in elections.
Vetëvendosje is good at shaking things up, and the thing that needs shaking is its approach in the future. Vetëvendosje was part of the opposition for so long that it never learnt to act like the party in power, which came with serious repercussions. Their belief that they are the “good guys” is constantly faced with the danger that they have the power, which must always be questioned. If that power is misused, it does not make it good because the good guys do it. For a government to complain that the media is criticising them is for them to complain that the media are doing their job, regardless of how well or not they do it.
Lastly, Kurti’s decision to go directly after corporations in his speeches, while having the bravado of a leftist leader and addressing a real frustration with neoliberal practices of mostly PDK and LDK-built elites, also indicates his lack of courage to trust the institutions he governs and whose independence is supposed to be safeguarded, to do their job and hold corporations accountable for misuses. This perhaps shows the greatest danger of Kosovo's political and institutional situation: Can the government (whoever it is led by) be trusted to trust its institutions? If not, then how can citizens trust them?