The previous year has been a turbulent one for Kosovo, which has fallen short of solidifying its international statehood since declaring independence in 2008. The political elite’s miscalculation in believing that merely aligning as a Western ally during the Ukraine crisis would secure equivalent support for Kosovo has proven unsuccessful. Nearly three years later, despite its claimed pro-Western rhetoric, Kosovo remains in confrontation with its Western allies, facing EU measures, and finds itself internationally weakened.

Kosovo’s declaration of independence was initially celebrated as a significant achievement for the rules-based multilateral order dominated by the democratic West. It was widely regarded as one of the most successful cases of international neoliberal intervention, often upheld as a model success story—until circumstances shifted. The decline of the unipolar world order, a fragmented and indecisive EU approach towards Kosovo, and broader geopolitical changes have significantly hampered its already challenging path to consolidating international statehood. While some attribute Kosovo’s limited progress to the shortcomings of its domestic political elites, the stagnation of Kosovo’s international also underscores a deeper structural weakness within the democratic world.

The political and security crises shaking the Western-dominated multilateral, rules-based order have introduced further uncertainty for Kosovo. Once a recipient of unwavering Western support for its independence, Kosovo now finds itself in a precarious position, losing that crucial backing. This shift is not entirely new —Western political capital invested in Kosovo has gradually waned over the past decade. Kosovo’s future statehood was effectively handed over to the EU in 2011, whose limited political capacity has struggled to facilitate a successful negotiation process between Kosovo and Serbia. The result has been a frozen conflict, with the EU seemingly settling for status quo, even as tensions periodically flare, threatening regional stability.

For over a decade, the Brussels Dialogue aimed to establish a framework for Kosovo’s diplomatic progress; however, it has become a source of stagnation. The EU’s non-recognising members have impeded the process. At the same time, its strategic partners appear to be losing patience with Kosovo, struggling to conclude the decades-long negotiations and provide a solution. Ensnared in the complexities of geopolitics and a Western emphasis on short-term stability, the EU urges Kosovo to implement the Brussels Agreements in good faith without clarifying what will happen next. This approach has transformed the dialogue into a "stick" wielded against Kosovo rather than a genuine pathway to resolution.

The Council of Europe Debacle

One of Kosovo's most significant setbacks in 2024 was its unsuccessful bid to join the Council of Europe. This represented a considerable blow to its aspirations for participation in multilateral platforms, rivalling previous disappointments with UNESCO in 2015 and Interpol in 2018. However, unlike those instances, the obstacles in the Council of Europe were less about non-recognising states and more about challenges posed by its strategic partners, particularly within the EU. This raises the question: Is Kosovo's membership in international cooperation mechanisms now hindered by its strategic partners rather than by non-recognising countries, as is commonly believed? Furthermore, it prompts the question of whether the countries that advocated for Kosovo’s statehood are setting a detrimental precedent by normalising and incentivising blocking behaviour towards Kosovo in the international arena.

The Council of Europe membership process initially progressed smoothly, raising hopes for success on international multilateral platforms. In March 2024, a significant positive shift occurred with the Government of Kosovo’s decision to implement the core of the Council of Europe membership conditionality—the implementation of the Constitutional Court Decision regarding the Dečani Monastery. This decision, surprising to many, was critical given Albin Kurti's previous strong opposition before he came to power. The contrast between his past populist rhetoric concerning the decision and his subsequent choice to implement it, while opposed by his political adversaries, has sparked internal debates about Kurti's readiness to ditch his own ‘red lines’. However, the membership process stagnated when conditionality extended beyond the Dečani Monastery; the accession process was hijacked by political demands rather than a merit-based process managed within the existing minority rights framework.

Diplomatically, Kosovo’s application to the Council of Europe seemed promising after the expulsion of its main obstacle, Russia, in 2022, presenting a unique opportunity for success. However, key Western powers, including Germany, France, and Italy, shifted the dynamics—not due to concerns over potential opposition from non-recognising states but as a desperate political ploy to influence the accession of Kosovo in the Council of Europe through the Association of Serbian Majority Municipalities —a process entirely separate from the Brussels Dialogue.

This setback reflects not only the Kosovo Government's lack of strategic foresight, insufficient preparation, and internal disarray but also the declining effectiveness of Western powers on multilateral platforms. The government’s missteps were evident in its sidelining of the President, who was part of the commitment letter sent to the Council of Europe ,and the hasty, poorly conceived last-minute proposal to establish the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities—a move that was quickly retracted. However, responsibility for this failure extends beyond Kosovo’s political elite; it underscores a deeper crisis in multilateralism and the fragmented state of Western influence, in which Kosovo is pressured to make concessions without any assurance that such compromises will resolve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute and contribute to regional stability.

The Association of Serb Municipalities: The Ultimate Leverage and the Trap

Kosovo’s domestic and international prospects are precariously tied to the fragile EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia. The agreement on the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities—signed in 2013, reaffirmed in 2015, and incorporated into the Brussels arrangements of 2023 as a renewed commitment between the EU and Kosovo—has become a significant point of contention. The EU views Kosovo almost exclusively through the lens of the dialogue with Serbia and the Association, reducing its broader aspirations to this single issue. This approach has strained relations between Kosovo and key EU members like Germany, France, and Italy, leading to tense diplomatic exchanges, particularly over the Association. The resulting lack of trust has brought diplomatic ties between Kosovo and its main strategic partners to a concerning low, further complicating Kosovo's European trajectory and future statehood.

In a shift from his previous strong opposition, Kurti committed to establishing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities as part of the Brussels and Ohrid arrangements in 2023. From Kurti's perspective, the Association serves as a bargaining chip once assurances are secured that it will advance Kosovo's interests and solidify its international status. However, the Kosovo Government cannot strategise incrementally. The political naivety in Kosovo’s failure to assess the situation on the ground—especially as the circumstances surrounding its independence face significant global challenges—has proven costly. The delays in drafting the statute for the Association, even after formally agreeing to establish it, have resulted in the EU’s version gaining traction among member states.

The ambiguity surrounding Kosovo’s potential accepting the draft status provided by the EU, combined with the failure to submit it to the Constitutional Court, underscores the lack of political ownership and incremental leveraging. Kosovo's offer and subsequent withdrawal of a last-minute draft further highlight its inability to navigate a complex process that shapes its internal operations and diplomatic relations. This failure has strained diplomatic ties with the EU and its member states, including Kosovo's principal backers, and worsened the already tense relationship between the government and the presidency. The marginalisation of the president, who leads foreign policy and is key to lobbying for Kosovo, reflects the concerning centralisation of power in the hands of the Prime Minister, which could be detrimental to Kosovo’s foreign policy.

Caught in a diplomatic debacle, Kosovo is poised to enter the election process in a compromised position with the EU, under sanctions contingent on a constructive approach in the Brussels Dialogue. After the elections, Kosovo will face a new reality with a new administration in the US and a new EU Commission, which has shown strong patterns of pragmatism in a Europe driven by geopolitics . Kosovo will be expected to compromise in the Brussels Dialogue without guaranteeing that this will strengthen its statehood or position within the EU. Without effective political leadership, this endeavour will be costly for Kosovo. Moreover, the EU's insistence on tying every process to the Association will likely perpetuate adverse effects, underscoring the lack of political clout to drive progress and a lack of clear strategy in addressing the Kosovo-Serbia issue.

Kosovo’s precarious position within the Brussels Dialogue and contested statehood during times of uncertainty carry significant internal and external risks. Internally, these vulnerabilities exacerbate political polarisation and instability, undermining the country’s governance and social cohesion. Externally, they contribute to the fragmentation of the Western front, providing ammunition for anti-Western propaganda and diminishing the credibility of the EU.