The re-elected President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, in her November 2024 speech to the European Parliament addressed the dream of Europe extending to the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Back in July 2024, while reflecting on the Western Balkans, she was even more positive and stated that the EU can only be stronger if it is larger. In addition to the generally encouraging words, she also said something that clearly implies a ‘business as usual’ attitude when it comes to the enlargement policy: “integrating them where we can into our legal frameworks”.

Essentially, this means that the main instrument remains the Growth Plan, which is merely an improved Berlin Process and does not guarantee that the countries will integrate into any area of ​​the European Single Market anytime soon. The basis for obtaining funds are reform agendas that are reported on completely separately. This may signal that this is a separate process, but it certainly means that it is the only safe one currently offered to the Western Balkans with concrete benefits. Although officials emphatically present the plan as offering huge funds to the Western Balkans over a three-year period, these actually come with long strings attached. Namely, out of a total of €6 billion, 2 billion are in non-refundable grants and 4 in loans on favorable terms.

Undoubtedly an important novelty that represents the basis for intensifying reforms, and based on the envisaged such possibility from the revised enlargement methodology, are sanctions and incentives. Precisely, the payment of money will be conditioned on the fulfillment of certain requirements (albeit on a very low scale when it comes to their complexity). However, from the aspect of the binding behavior of potential future EU members, it is extremely problematic that formally in these conditions there is no alignment with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is therefore paradoxical that the most money (€1.6 billion) is allocated to Serbia, which is the only country that has a ca. 50% alignment with CFSP, and therefore the least willing to implement common standards and values.

It is also praiseworthy that since last year, 4 Western Balkan countries have been included in the Rule of Law (RoL) instrument. Within its framework, reports have so far been prepared only for the EU member states, but there is room for improving the assessments so that they truly serve their purpose, especially in the part containing binding recommendations.

On paper and in legal terms, there are no significant changes in the approach towards the Western Balkans. In practice, and after the recent progress regarding the opening and closing of chapters and clusters by two countries (Albania and Montenegro), there seems to be an encouraging rhetoric from EU officials. However, those from the Commission, are at the forefront of positivism as opposed to member states, claiming that with this pace of reforms, “at least one or two” countries could join the European Union in the next five years. A recent visit to Montenegro by the Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos was also full of encouraging and promising words.

Considering all of the above and the current state of play in the European integration process of 6 countries (wherein Montenegro has opened all chapters, with 6 provisionally closed, Serbia has opened 22, with 2 provisionally closed, Albania 7 (2 clusters), North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina without open chapters, and Kosovo without candidate status), the following scenarios are possible (with greater or lesser probability) by the end of this European Commission's mandate:

1. Only Montenegro joins the EU: this scenario has a fair chance, as the country is a) the most advanced in the accession talks, b) with an approved roadmap by the EC to close all chapters by the end of 2026, c) a small country that cannot destabilize the European Single Market, d) its accession does not require EU institutional reforms because one seat is already vacant and the limitation of the number of commissioners and members of the European Parliament established by the Treaty of Lisbon does not have to be subject to changes. Potential problems on this path include the non-European and non-civic character of the Government and parliamentary majority and the unstable political situation in the country. Reform implementation is also not at a sufficiently high level. However, with regard to a potential political decision on accession, the first mentioned problems will be of crucial importance.
2. Montenegro and Albania join the EU together: the Commissioner for Enlargement recently mentioned this scenario as a desirable one, but with a very low level of probability. Namely, in order to join the EU in 2028 or 2029, Albania cannot even technically prepare all the necessary documents for opening and closing chapters. Taking into account the state of the rule of law, the general political situation, and what is being presented as the fight against corruption, the country is indeed significantly lagging behind.
3. All Western Balkan countries join the EU: this, the most desirable scenario, is possible in a dream-like situation in which EU leaders wake up one morning and decide to do what they should have done when the war in Ukraine broke out – to politically integrate all countries that want to be part of the Western value framework and jointly build on what the EU was founded on. In such a scenario, countries would join the EU without any rights, especially without the right of veto and commissioners, and would integrate according to the already existing principle of “multi-speed Europe”. This would practically mean that those countries that meet the criteria would be included and integrated into certain areas of the acquis when they are ready. Such a model would allow the EU to invest money in its own backyard and would also force it to look for a model for its own (institutional and political) reform on the fly. Although this is the best scenario for everyone, the chances for it are almost non-existent.
4. No Western Balkan country joins the EU: in this scenario, EU member states decide not to turn a blind eye to anyone’s lack of readiness, a decision which would bring an end to the enlargement policy. Although the chances of this scenario are the highest, as a citizen of Montenegro I will conclude this blog by estimating that there is a 50-50 chance of the first or last scenario happening.