Germany’s likely next chancellor Friedrich Merz promised increased European leadership and security. While his party supports gradual integration of the Western Balkans and more flexible cooperation between European states, the region will not be a priority and a lot depends on external factors.
Shortly after the exit polls had declared his party the winner of the 2025 German parliamentary elections, likely future chancellor Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) announced his priorities for the coming months: forming a stable government as soon as possible and strengthening European unity and security in light of historical challenges. With Merz, who is a former MEP (1989-1994), his CDU being a member of the largest group in the European Parliament, the European People’s Party (EPP), expectations in Brussels are high. A coalition between the CDU and its Bavarian sister party CSU with the social democrats (SPD) of incumbent chancellor Olaf Scholz is the most likely scenario, but their narrow majority and the strength of the extreme-right AfD in parliament will likely complicate things.
Needless to say, the Western Balkans were not a hot topic during the election campaign, which was dominated by mostly populist and seldom constructive debates on irregular migration. At the same time, Merz has clearly positioned himself as a European leader who is ready to take over responsibility for the continent’s future. Pressed on EU enlargement during a debate at the Körber Forum in January, he presented a preliminary vision for a Europe where countries are not “all in or all out” but integrated into EU processes and decisions even without full membership, explicitly mentioning the Western Balkans alongside the UK and Turkey. He touched on the idea of “concentric circles” with different degrees of integration, a concept devised by CDU-veterans Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers in 1994 and picked up in a similar form in the 2023 French-German proposal on EU reforms and enlargement.
Merz’ ideas are in line with a proposal brought forward by the CDU in June 2022 on “Renewing the Western Balkans countries’ EU perspective through an engaged policy” which emphasised the need for a credible inclusion of the six countries through a more gradual integration process – a goal recently reiterated in the EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 – and closer cooperation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The proposal furthermore highlights the crucial importance of territorial integrity and the Berlin Process, introduced by Angela Merkel in 2014 after then European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s renunciation of further enlargement, to foster regional cooperation.
While Merz shows leadership ambitions, his notorious hot-headedness might prove unhelpful when it comes to the need to compromise and find solutions. Based on his comments on a more differentiated integration approach, Merz might opt for a coalition of the willing to unblock the CSDP from its unanimity principle. He seeks closer ties with both France and Poland which were muted under Scholz’ chancellorship. This might also open a space for more cooperation with the Western Balkan countries, most of which are firmly aligned with the CSDP and sanctions against Russia. However, the region is no priority and will likely find itself affected by the geopolitical rivalries fuelled not only by the Russian aggression, but also by a US government threatening European security and economy. As irregular migration will remain high on the agenda, reliance on the countries along the “Balkan Route” to prevent refugees from entering the EU is likely to increase, which opens the door for local strongmen to reinforce their positions. In the same vein, the focus on stability is likely to increase, further sidelining ambitious democratic reforms to the delight of the stabilitocrats.
Specifically, the Bundestag will lose key politicians supporting EU enlargement and regional engagement such as Thomas Hacker (FDP) and Josip Juratović (SPD), while others like Boris Mijatović (Greens), Knut Abraham (CDU) and Adis Ahmetović (SPD) have secured another term. The Greens, under whose leadership the German Foreign Office has increased its engagement in the Western Balkans, will likely join the opposition. Crucially, the next government’s ability to foster internal cohesion will enable it to regain credibility in its foreign policy and avoid the notorious “German vote” which regularly diminished Berlin’s influence in Brussels. Germany’s leading role in the Western Balkans was undermined by solo actions of the chancellery and a lack of coordination between foreign, security and development cooperation policies, most visible in its approach to Belgrade and Prishtina. Whether the next government choses to extend the position of a Special Envoy for the Western Balkans will be a good indicator of the importance the region holds for the new government, as will its approach to the Berlin Process.
A key factor for the German approach towards the Western Balkans is the future of Serbia, given both its weight and influence in the region and its EU connections, including with German political parties. The governing SNS party is associated with the EPP but also has strong ties with the AfD, the latter echoing the SNS narrative of attributing protests to a “coloured revolution” instigated by Western powers. The other opposition party Die LINKE is unlikely to play a constructive role either, although they have become less vocal on the region since the pro-Russian BSW party split also included Żaklin Nastić, a key mouthpiece of the Serbian government who will leave the Bundestag with the other BSW members after the party narrowly missed the five percent threshold.
The Trump presidency meanwhile remains a wild card. While his administration is not showing immediate ambitions to meddle directly in the region – apart from lucrative business deals – Trump’s approach on the future of Ukraine leaves no doubt that he is not interested in coordinating foreign policy decisions with the EU. Merz has acknowledged this new rivalry and urged for increased European autonomy, including its relations to the United States. But without a shared vision or at least a coalition of the willing, a fading accession perspective is unlikely to present a credible alternative to the transactional deals Trump can offer to regional strongmen, while ordinary people continue to emigrate in droves.