In the RS, the picture is more complicated. Dodik and his “Alliance of Independent Socialdemocrats” (neither an alliance, nor independent, nor socialdemocratic) lost a lot of support, including their post in the state presidency. However, the victory of Mladen Ivanić might prove a Pyrrhic victory, as the opposition failed to capture the presidency of the RS from Dodik, even though it got very close, and it looks like Dodik’s party will hang on to power in the parliament of the RS. Thus, Dodik is considerably weaker than he was four years ago, but he is hanging on.
The results thus show a weakening of the incumbent in the RS and a defeat in the Federation. The result is a return to power of parties that have dominated politics in Bosnia before 2010 and displayed little ability or willingness to pursue a more constructive or reform-oriented political agenda. Thus, the elections are change without change.
A central feature of Bosnian politics that has contributed to the sense of disempowerment among many citizens has been the perception that nobody ever loses office and everybody is in power somewhere. Thus, SDA was not in power in the Federation, but it held the Bosniak presidency member, HDZ was first locked out of power, but came back later as the government was reshuffled. Theparty of Fahrudin Radončić joined government, but then he was dismissed in the spring. The main opposition parties in the RS were at least for some time part of the governing coalition at the state level. The lines between opposition and government became so blurred that the combination of multiple layers of government, grand coalitions and instable majority resulted in a dynamic where everybody was in power and nobody was to blame. The protests in February 2014 were not least a product of this general sense that the entire political elite is not only discredited, but also indistinguishable. The elections provides for an opportunity to have a (for Bosnian standards) clearly majority and an opposition and thus to provide for an opportunity for more clear-cut political competition. However, the fruits of such clarity will take some time and the electoral system that gives disproportional weight to smaller parties might throw a wrench in such a dynamic.
The key question in the coming months and years will be, whether the political left, represented by the SDP and the Democratic Front in the Federation, is able to form a coherent and reformed political option. Key will be the ability of the SDP to reform and rid itself of Zlatko Lagumdžija, the now longest serving party president with Milorad Dodik. In the RS, the question will be whether the opposition will be able to continue confronting Dodik and potentially pulling some its coalition partners on their side.
Finally, a note about the EU, although released the latest progress reportjust a few days before the elections, it seems to have had little impact. This is again a reflection of the apparent lack of choice, everybody is for EU accession and so EU accession has become such a bland and universally shared (and equally universally disregarded) goal that it (currently) fails to work as a yardstick according to which measure the performance of political parties.
A striking feature of the election is the continued dominance of long established politicians on the Bosnian scene. While there are few small signs of change, such as the entry of Naša Stranka into the Federation parliament, politics is very dominated those who have been at it for a long time, whether it is those who lost or those won these elections. Thus, change does not come through elections, but through the four long years in between. Whether this will be through a change of parties and their leaders or through pressure from below is unclear, but it seem likely that only a combination of the two might bring more substantial change. In the meantime, it is business as usual for Bosnia and this is hardly good news.